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Hanson: Women Prisoners

WOMEN PRISONERS: FREEDOM FROM
SEXUAL HARASSMENT-A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In terms of sexual harassment inside it certainly
happens often and consistently. That's why
women inside often put forth the demand for all
female guards. The harassment occurs on many
levels-from a guard walking in on a woman undressing (that happens regularly), to sexual attacks by guards and staff. Any prisoner would say
there's sexual harassment inside (if she wasn't
afraid of repercussions, that is.p

Sexual harassment2 of female inmates by male guards permeates American prisons because the imbalance of power between the guard and the prisoner allows and encourages it to
exist. s Sexual harassment in prison is not a series of isolated incidents;· rather, it is so much a part of the power structure that
it is almost invisible. II
Women prisoners are forced to endure invasions of their
1. Letter from Stephanie Erickson, writer for THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, to Laurie Hanson (Sept. 6, 1982). (THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS is a women's and children's
prison newsletter published by a prisoner rights' group in Seattle, Washington).
2. Sexual harassment is "any unwanted sexual attention a woman experiences ...
ranging from leering, pinching, patting, verbal comments, and subtle pressure for sexual
activity, to attempted rape and rape." ALLI.'NCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, FIGHTING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION]
(ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION was formed in Boston to work against sexual harassment in the workplace).
3. Id. at 7. All literature on the subject deals with sexual harrassment in the market
place. As the imbalance of power in prison is more marked than on the outside, all statistics and analyses are used by analogy. See also, C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 1-23, 156-58, 174-82 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MACKINNON] for an
excellent discussion of male dominance over women as the background for sexual harassment. The author also discusses occupational segregation and income inequality which
are forms of sexual harassment in and of themselves. "[S]exual harassment of women
can occur largely because women occupy inferior job positions and job roles; at the same
time, sexual harassment works to keep women in such positions. Sexual harassment,
then, uses and helps create women's structurally inferior status." Id. at 9-10.
4. ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 2, at 10. In 1976, Redbook Magazine conducted a survey in which 88% of the 9,000 respondents reported that they had
experienced one or more forms of sexual harassment on the job. Id. at 10.
5. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 1.
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bodily privacy ranging from being viewed in the nude 6 to being
forced to submit to body cavity and pat searches in the presence
of, and in emergencies by, male guards.' At times they engage in
"voluntary"8 relations with the guards-bartering sex for psychological and physical freedom. 9 If a staff member requests sex6. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd and remanded,
566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (1978), vacated in part, 621
F.2d 1210 (1980) (inmates brought suit alleging invasion of privacy due to presence of
male guards in living quarters and infirmary). See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying
text; An Inside Look from Raleigh, North Carolina, No MORE CAGES, Oct. 1980, at 9-10
(allegations that from any location on camp, a male officer can stand and watch women
undress through the window); Male Guards-The Struggle is Spreading, No MORE
CAGES, Dec. 1980, at 121 (female inmates in Oregon filed a civil suit on the basis of lack
of privacy suffered because of the presence of male guards at the prison).
7. See, e.g., Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981) (body cavity search in
the presence of male guards); K. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 94 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as BURKHART) (quoting a male warden: "[b)eing in jail is harder on a woman than a
man. . . . She comes in here and we undress her and tell her to 'bend over lady' to look
for contraband. We make her bathe in front of everyone . . . . That sort of thing can
break your spirit."); Bedford Hills Again . .. , THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, Dec. 1979,
at 5 (allegations that women were being stripped naked in front of male officers); Another Bed of Nails to Chew on, No MORE CAGES, Dec. 1980, at 44 (women from California Institution for Women speak out on humiliation felt when stripped naked by two
male officers and one female officer); BURKHART, supra at 155 (in Clinton, New Jersey
male guard tore clothes off female inmate and forced her to lie down in a spread-eagle
position; matron did nothing).
8. Letter from Dr. Jan Mickish, Professor of Criminology at Ball State University to
William C. Erbecker, attorney (Sept. I, 1981) (copy on file with Laurie Hanson).
Any sexual activity between inmate and staff must be viewed
in the context of the social setting from which it has emerged
and the prison setting within which it occurs. Men and women
have long been socialized to view sex as as female commodity:
to be sought after by males, to be exchanged for goods and
services by females. This social characterization of males, females, and sex continues into the prison setting where male
correctional officers have powers beyond their counterparts in
the non prison setting . . . . For a staff member to request
sexual activity is tantamount to a demand. For a staff member
to agree to a sexual request made by an inmate is to compromise his position as an agent of the state . . . . Throughout
this whole process, it is the staff member who has the ultimate
power over the inmate.
9. See, e.g., BURKHART, supra note 7, at 302-03 (female prisoner working as a domestic worker for warden became pregnant); Jones, One Woman Who Chose to Say No, THE
NATION 456 (April 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Jones) Carol Ann Wilds, an inmate at
Indiana Women's Prison, is'a victim of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse by
male personnel. She became pregnant while in prison and filed suit against the prison for
damages. She has subsequently dropped the charges. When an investigator interviewed
two dozen inmates of Women's Prison, all had witnessed or knew of instances of sexual
exploitation. Thirty-eight inmates signed a petition supporting Wild's allegations. Id. at
459. At a hearing at the California Institution for Women (CIW) in 1977, a California
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ual favors, it may be perceived by the inmate as a demand.
Thus, even so-called "voluntary" sexual activity must be viewed
as coercive. 10 Women prisoners are also victims of sexual abuse
and rape. l l
assembly committee found that: "Inmates are subject to sexual coercion and in at least
one instance an inmate has become pregnant while serving her sentence at CIW with no
apparent disciplinary measures taken against the staff person or persons involved." THE
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON CORRECTIONS, THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR
WOMEN: ONE YEAR LATER, at iv (July 21, 1977). Life and Love in a Co-ed Prison, 7
STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1979, at 52-53 (in Seagoville, Texas, guards had to leave because
too emotionally involved with prisoners); Adams v. Matthias, 458 F. Supp. 302, 306 (S.D.
Ala. 1978) (the court stated that upon occasion jail officials engaged in sexual activity
with female inmates at the jail; one inmate became pregnant and subsequently had an
abortion); Muncy Prison Inmate Gives Birth to Baby Boy, THE GUIDE, June 13, 1979, at
1 Col. 1. In Muncy, Pennsylvania, a 16-year-old became pregnant while incarcerated; the
guard charged pleaded nolo contendere. Four additional women who complained about
sexual exploitation at Muncy have all taken lie detector tests and passed. "Sexual Harassment is not only the process of the staff asking for sexual activity, but also it is the
staff member accepting, for this accepting sets into motion a whole series of sexual and
psychological patterns that will ultimately victimize all female inmates." Letter from Dr.
Jan Mickish, supra note 8.
10. See Rape as a Political Tool, No MORE CAGES, June/July 1979, 32:
Rape of women prisoners by male guards is a common occurrence. Whether it is just a matter of sexual abuse of women in
a defenseless situation, a tool to generally harass, humiliate
and break their spirit and will, or a means of intimidation and
punishment for those who persist in struggling and maintaining their strength and integrity; rape is the one act' of violence
specifically reserved for women.
Id.
11. See Who's Who at Bedford Hills: Sexual Harassment by Male Guards,
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, July/August 1982, 6. There have been allegations of numerous sex abuses at Bedford Hills. One guard from Bedford Hills has recently been
indicted for rape in the first degree, three counts of coercion, and one count of official
misconduct. Another guard pleaded guilty to official misconduct and was sentenced to
one year conditional discharge. Telephone interview with David Klein, Branch Chief of
Northern Westchester District Attorney's Office, New York (March, 1983).
Carol Ann Wilds and another prisoner at Indiana Women's Prison were raped while
in the hospital facilities. All personnel'involved have been transferred or have resigned.
Jones, supra note 9, at 459. See J. CHAPMAN, ECONOMIC REALITIES AND THE FEMALE OFFENDER, 152 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CHAPMAN] (attempted rape of JoAnne Little by
prison guard in North Carolina).
See also Bedford Hills: Segregation is Dangerous to Your Health, No MORE CAGES,
June/July 1979,9 "Things were pretty bad before the male guards came back, and their
presence there has already aggravated the situation . . . . [T]he mere fact that they walk
around with long night sticks when no female guards carry these nightsticks is an irritating threat to women;" BURKHART, supra note 7, at 325-27 (prisoners of Women's House
of Detention list allegations including being beaten by guards); Focus on Marysville, No
MORE CAGES, Oct. 1980, 32 (Ohio women spoke out against brutality of male guards). As
a result of speaking out, however, No MORE CAGES was banned from the Ohio institution. Stop Prison Censorship!, No MORE CAGES, July/Aug. 1981,7.
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There are few reported cases of sexual harassment of
women prisoners. Until recently sexual harassment, even outside
the prison, went unnoticed. I2 Also, if a prisoner reports sexual
abuse, the prison administration will generally blame the prisoner, or deny the accusation, but only occasionally fire the
guard. 13 Consequently, prisoners infrequently report abuses.
Further, women prisoners as a class have received little attention.14 They do not bring lawsuits to protest grievances because
they fear for their own safety. 111 It is difficult for women prisoners to gain access to the courts due to a lack of available services
within the prisons. IS In recent years, however, interest in female
prisoners' plight has been renewed. Suits have been filed on
their behalf which have identified issues unique to them,I7 in12. See Jones, supra note 9, at 456 ("women don't challenge the conditions of ...
confinement ... because prison is much like the oppression [women face] in the outside
world."); L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN 12 (1978) "[S]exual harassment of working
women has been practiced by men since women first went to work for wages. It ... has
gone virtually unchallenged, largely as a result of a wide social acceptance of such
behavior. "
13. See supra notes 9 & 11. In regard to the Wilds case, discussed supra note 9, an
Indiana Women's Prison guard, while calling Wilds' charges false, added that if he had
to get up on the stand and say "I know there is no sexual harassment," he couldn't do
that. Frederick & Iknovian, Sex Behind Bars?, WOMANKIND, at 9 (1981).
14. Historically, women have only comprised 4-5% of the prison population. CHAPMAN, supra note 11, at 3-4. See also Albert, Women Prisoners and the Law: Which Way
will the Pendulum Swing?, 10 J. CRIM. L. 38 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Albert]. Traditionally courts were reluctant to get involved in prison issues at all, and left the prison
administration to govern as it saw fit. This "hands off" doctrine began changing in the
late 1960's and to date there are some legal remedies available. See infra notes 83-92 and
accompanying text. Most prison litigation has been on behalf of male prisoners. Prison
reform workers have also not taken as great an interest in the female prisoner because
conditions in the women's prisons are often not brought to public attention. Women's
prisons are not threatened by the riots and violence that plague men's institutions and
create sensational press coverage. See also Fabian, Toward the Best Interests of Women
Prisoners: Is The System Working?, NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. I, 32 (1979); CHAPMAN,
supra note 11, at 2, 5 (women perceived as passive and non-threatening to institutional
security).
15. Jones, supra note 9, at 456, 459. A few of the women were willing to talk on the
record to the investigator "though prison pressure against that was formidable." Id.
16. Albert, supra note 14, at 38; Fabian, supra note 14, at 33. Until recently, jailhouse lawyers in women's institutions were uncommon. Id.
17. Snow, Women in Prison, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1065 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Snow]. Issues identified have included: (1) equal access to vocational and educational
program, Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (discrepancy in educational and vocational programs); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d I, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1979) (denial of minimum security jail facilities and their attendant privileges); (2) the
right to health and adequate gynecological services, Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Todaro v. Couglin, 652 F.2d
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eluding rape and sexual abuse by guards 18 and the right to bodily privacy. 19
Prisoners necessarily face unwanted surveillance and touching by prison personnel for the purpose of detecting contraband
and for institutional security.20 Sexual harassment is distinguished from desired, mutual sexual activity by the fact that the
recipient views the attention as unwanted. Since all observation
in prison is basically unwanted, it is crucial that formal boundaries be established as to the type of viewing or touching duties a
male guard may perform. This Comment will examine the tension that results from placing male guards in female correctional
facilities and suggest the boundaries which must be established
to ensure that the prisoners' rights. are protected. While there
are other avenues available to the inmate, both legal and admin54 (2d Cir. 1981) (substandard medical care for women inmates held unconstitutional as
a violation of the eighth amendment); (3) the right to retain and breast feed infants born
during incarceration and other issues surrounding pregnancy, see generally Note, Nine
Months to Life-The Law and the Pregnant Inmate, 20 J. FAM. L. 523 (1981); and (4)
the right to retain contact with her children during incarceration, see Snow, supra at
1065; Note, Nine Months to Life-The Law and the Pregnant Inmate, supra at 536.
The Statement of purpose, No MORE CAGES, (June/July 1979) declares:
We have chosen to focus on women in prison because . . .
there are problems special to women in prison, as distinguished from the oppression faced by all those in prison: The
presence and physical threat of male guards, the overall sexism of the prison system, the lack of specialized training which
leads to fewer available jobs, the tragedy of mothers separated
from their children, the assault on women's reproductive organs, and much more.
On November 7, 1980, there was a national conference on women in prison. Workehop
and speaker issues included the physical and psychological aspects of imprisonment (sexual and medical abuse) and examples of sexual abuse in prison including unnecessary
and humiliating vaginal searches. See also Conference on Women in Prison: Report from
Atlanta, GA., No MORE CAGES, Dec. 1980, 41-42).
According to Chapman, this new interest in the female offender and prisoner is due
in part to the perception that criminal activity has increased among women, but, she
feels the major impetus seems to be the women's movement. Women are (re)discovering
the role sexism plays in the criminal process as they identify the disparate treatment
men and women receive throughout the judicial process and incarceration. CHAPMAN,
supra note 11, at 6, 21-38.
18. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text; Snow, supra note 17, at 1065
(mentions the right not to be guarded by males which flows directly from rape and privacy issues).
20. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 553-560 (1978) (although inmates retain privacy
rights upon incarceration, they must be balanced against significant and legitimate security interests of the institution). See also infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
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istrative,21 the establishment of a constitutional right to bodily
privacy lays the groundwork for protection against any form of
sexual harassment from which other remedies may evolve.
Women inmates have a constitutional right to privacy, dignity,
and autonomy in regard to their own bodies, and this includes
the right to be free from sexual abuse and harassment by male
guards. There is no reasonable justification for any infringement
upon this right.
I.

BACKGROUND: SEXUAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN PRISONS

Sexual harassment of women in prison as well as the subsequent disregard for the victims of the harassment is not a new
phenomenon. The earliest documented incident between a male
guard and a female prisoner occured 'in 1826. 22 When a grand
jury investigated the death of an Auburn prisoner and discovered that she had died during childbirth after she had received a
severe flogging, they ignored the fact that she had become pregnant while in solitary confinement. 28 The scandal created when
knowledge of this incident reached the public may have spurred
the passage of the 1828 law which required segregation of male
and female prisoners. 24 Even when prisoners were successfully
segregated by sex, however, women prisoners were supervised by
male guards who often took sexual liberties with them;21i due to
over-crowding and basic disinterest in women prisoners and
their rehabilitation, even the presence of matrons did not lessen
the abuse.28 The pregnancy at Auburn was not an isolated inci21. For a discussion of tort remedies for sexual harassment see Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 879 (1980); For a discussion of sexual harassment as sex discrimination see
MACKINNON, supra note 3; For a discussion of Title VII remedies see Comment, Title
VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REV. 123 (1977). Administrative remedies are also available. See intra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. See
also Fabian, supra note 14, at 53. It would be to the prisoners' benefit to have members
of community groups, such as local rape crisis centers, serve on committees which both
oversee the administration of the prison and have direct contact with the prisoners.
22. E. FREEDMAN, THEIR SISTER'S KEEPERS 15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]; N. Shafer, By Women For Women: America's First Separate Prison for Women 17
n.32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Shafer] (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with
Laurie Hanson).

23. [d.
24. [d.
25. Albert, supra note 14, at 37.
26. Shafer, supra note 22, at 9-10. This is stiJI true today; see supra note 14. BURKHART, supra note 7, at 155, 326, 332; FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 16; But ct. CHAPMAN,
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dent, as most accounts of prisons during the 1800's mention illegitimate births. 27
Society regarded women prisoners as "fallen" women and
beyond redemption. 28 Socially, women were seen as having a
"superior morality" to that of men. 29 Therefore, if a woman
committed a crime, she had denied her own pure nature and was
"more depraved than her male counterpart."30 In the 1860's the
plight of the "fallen" woman was reconsidered and the notion
that she could be reformed (by women) was embraced by novelists and Christian reform workers.31 The commitment to create a
pleasant, supportive, productive community of women came in
part from the reformers' belief that most women were not intentional criminals but were lured into such activity by their husbands or boyfriends, or out of economic necessity.32
Women prisoners were considered useless and were neglected by prison authorities because their numbers were few
and their labor could not be sold. The neglect, however, was not
benign "[R]ather a pattern of overcrowding, harsh treatment
and sexual abuse recurred throughout prison histories. "33 Prison
authorities opposed the segregation movement, even though
they considered the women prisoners useless, because they did
not want to lose their domestic help.34
In 1868 the governor of Indiana solicited two Quaker prison
reformers to investigate conditions at the state prison and submit a report to him. 311 Although the Quakers observed many
abuses occurring within the prison, they were most distressed by
the sexual abuses the women suffered:
supra note 11, at 3-4 (high incidence of sexual abuse in southern jails attributed to the
almost total absence of matrons.)
27. See FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 16, 59, 60; Shafer, supra note 22, at 6-11, 17.
28. Shafer, supra note 22, at 17.
29. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 17.
30. Shafer, supra note 22, at 14-21 (general discussion of the "fallen" woman and
her threat to Victorian society.)
31. Id. at 40.
32. Note, Pioneers in Prison, 44 FED. PROBATION 30, 31 (Sept. 1980); See also BURKHART, supra note 4, at 366-68; CHAPMAN, supra note 11, at 15-17. For a general discussion
of the professional reformers see FREEDMAN, supra note 22 ..
33. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 15.
34. Albert, supra note 14, at 37.
35. Shafer, supra note 22, at 5.
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A number of the guards had keys to the women's
prison and entered when they wished to gratify
their lusts. If the women could be bought up, they
gave them trinkets or goods out of the government store, if they did not yield, they were reported as incorrigible and stripped and whipped
in the presence of as many as wished to see. In
the court of the prison there was a large reservoir. . . . On sabbath afternoons, the women prisoners were brought out and compelled to strip
and . . . required to run from the opposite side
and jump into the water, the guards using, if necessary, their lashes to drive them out to the howling amusement of the guards and their friends
who were permitted to be present, keeping it up
as long as they pleased. 38

When the scandals the Quakers uncovered came to light in the
late 1860's, the progressive movement to reform women prisoners and to create humane facilities for each sex gained considerable support.37 The reformers believed that separate facilities
were necessary to protect the women from physical abuse 38 as
well as sexism. Many reformers believed that, just as in society
at large, men contributed to, rather than cured, women's delinquency.39 Therefore, to reform the female offender and to keep
her free from sexual abuse, a separate facility (reformatory) was
necessary. Reform could only be achieved if women were governed by a staff who could supply them with the necessary
morals and feminine treatment. 40 "[S]ince industry, morality
and religion were regarded as the province of women, only
women were capable of staffing the reformatory."41
The first women's prison opened in Indiana in 1873.42 By
3S. [d. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 59-SO (prostitution rings and other
abuses operating within prisons). It is interesting that in almost every other account of
the reform and segregation movement, the incidence of sexual abuse is not mentioned.
Sexual abuse and rape of women has traditionally been hidden, and prison is no
exception.
37. Shafer, supra note 22, at 12.
38. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 52,59,SO; see also BURKHART, supra note 4, at 83;
Shafer, supra note 22, at S-10.
39. [d.
40. Shafer, supra note 22, at 7-14.
41. [d. at 14.
42. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 144-45.
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1940 a total of twenty-three states had established separate
women's prisons, and by 1975 only sixteen states lacked them. 43
However, the idealism and energy of the reformers did not survive the changes in prison administration over the years. 44 As
early as the 1920's the separate prison, although run by women,
no longer existed to serve women. Rather, the prisons were administered by women who did not share the feminist philosophy
that women prisoners could be reformed. These administrators
were not critical of men's prisons or male dominated institutions. 411 Today, female prisoners find themselves in "punitive-security-based environments the women's prison reform movement was organized to oppose" because prison authorities
question whether institutional rehabilitation (reform) is successful. 46 Indeed, what began as a measure to help and protect
women, deteriorated over the years into more neglect and restrictive and unequal separation. 47
The segregation of prisons did not end sexual harassment of
women prisoners. Some states did not create separate facilities
at a11,46 and others allowed men to guard women with no restrictions. 49 The problem of sexual harassment of women prisoners is
still rampant. IIO
Whatever the shortcomings of the institutions the
reformers created, they had clear insight into the
dangers of male-dominated institutions. Many of
the hostile attitudes toward female criminals they
identified a hundred years ago persist today
throughout society. The stigma of woman's fall
may be less critical, but the fact that most women
prisoners are now not only poor but also nonwhite compounds their powerlessness. The old reformist concern for women's victimization has
new foundations that necessitate continued scrutiny of the criminal justice system. III
43. [d.
44. CHAPMAN, supra note 1, at 16.
45. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 155.
46. Fabian, supra note 14, at 6.
47. Snow, supra note 17, at 1065.
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. See Appendix A, infra for present day statistics regarding the number of male
guards in women's prisons and the restrictions placed on them.
50. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
51. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 157.
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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: PROTECTING BODILY INTEGRITY

The basis for a prisoner's right to freedom from sexual harassment, or the right to bodily integrity may be found within the
fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches or the more general right of privacy which has been recognized within that amendment.
Prior to 1967, fourth amendment violations occurred if
there was a finding of physical trespass. 1I11 That privacy and dignity could be invaded without a physical trespass of any sort was
not part of any judicial privacy theory. liS Justice Brandeis, however, laid the groundwork for such a concept in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States. 1I4 "[T]o protect [the right to be let
alone] every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the fourth amendment."1111 Brandeis'
concept of privacy was adopted fifty years later in Katz v.
United States when the United States Supreme Court held that
fourth amendment protection cannot stop with physical trespass. 1I6 Katz laid the foundation for the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" theory upon which many fourth amendment decisions now rest, including decisions protecting reasonable expectations of physical or bodily privacy.1I7 Involuntary exposure of
one's naked body has been held to be a violation of that right.1I8
Thus, the unwanted observation of female inmates by male
guards may be a violation of a reasonable expectation of bodily
privacy.
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was the first decision in which the
Court enunciated that a fourth amendment violation could occur without physical trespass. The Court held that evidence heard over a wiretap during the course of a criminal
investigation was illegally obtained because defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy while placing a call in a phone booth. The Court stated that the fourth amendment protects people, not places. 1d. at 353.
53. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (evidence heard over a
wiretap was legally obtained because there was no physical trespass).
54. 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
55. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56. 389 U.S. at 353.
57. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968) (stop and frisk procedures are
within the purview of the fourth amendment).
58. York v. Storey, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Storey v. York,
376 U.S. 939 (1964) (police officers who unnecessarily photographed female assault victim and subsequently passed the photographs around were held to have violated the
woman's right to privacy).
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The right to bodily privacy may also be found within the
concept of privacy developed from the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.r.s The articulation of this concept of privacy,60 philosophical in both its analysis and effect,
was the beginning of a new era of substantive due process and,
hence, an expansion of individual human rights. In G.riswold, the
concept of privacy has its roots in specific constitutional provisions, but it is not restricted in scope or content solely by the
express language of the enumerated rights. 61 Griswold and its
progeny62 protect an interest similar to that found in the fourth
amendment-the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, specifically matters relating to procreation. This interest is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 63
59. 381 u.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
Connecticut statute prohibiting distribution of, and married persons' use of, contraceptives. The Court held that in light of, and emanating from, decisions which embrace
rights peripheral to the first amendment, and various guarantees implicit in the third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, a zone of privacy is created. Thus, even though
marriage is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, it may be included in this
zone of privacy and thereby deemed fundamental.
60. The right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution and its
origin is unclear. Privacy is a judicially developed concept, whose birth and growth reflect the Court's determination to advance principles it feels society is willing or ready to
accept. The "right" was first discussed in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891), where the Court stated: "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, ,than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. As individuals bring suit to contest governmental control over certain aspects of their lives, decisions are rendered which clarify
the "rights" the Supreme Court deems fundamental. Thus, the Constitution can be seen
as a "statement of political principles, to be interpreted and applied by the Court in
light of changing circumstances." Beany, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right
To Privacy, WIS. L. REV. 979, 986 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Beany). The author quotes
Chief Justice Marshall: "We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding," a Constitution "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be
adapted to the various crises in human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
61. According to the Court, this right derives from natural law; from the ninth
amendment; from the word "liberty" in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as shadows or penumbras of the bill of Rights, thus creating "zones
of privacy"; or as a combination of all these expressions. See generally, Beany, supra
note 60.
62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extended the right to be free from
governmental intrusion when buying contraceptives to individuals, regardless of marital
status, on the theory that prohibiting the sale of, or information regarding, contraceptives to unmarried persons, while permitting it to married persons, violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as the unmarried persons' right to
privacy).
63. In Griswold, part of the rationale for finding the statute unconstitutional was
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In Roe v. Wade,84 the Supreme Court enunciated a new interest emanating from a different source. 811 This interest,
founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, was broad enough to encompass a woman's right to privacy in deciding whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.88 Thus, there exists a fundamental
right for a woman to make certain choices regarding her body
and reproduction.
This general concept of privacy found within the fourth
amendment, Griswold, Roe, and their progeny encompasses developing interests which flow from the basic guidelines expressed
by the Court.87 The autonomy and dignity of a woman prisoner
to remain free from sexual harassment should certainly be protected by this general concept of privacy.

III.

BODILY INTEGRITY INSIDE THE PRISON WALLS

A prison is, almost by definition, a place where the resident
has lost her privacy.88 Therefore, it is not surprising that a concept of a right to bodily privacy and autonomy for women prisoners has not yet been formulated by the Supreme Court.89
the knowledge that to find otherwise would mandate that the government patrol marital
bedrooms looking for evidence, clearly an invasion of privacy. 479 U.S. at 485-86. See
also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating restrictions on distribution of nonprescription contraceptives as being at the heart of constitutionally protected choices; access to contraceptives is necessary to protect the fundamental right guaranteed in Griswold).
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. [d. at 153. The Court stressed that the right may emanate from the ninth
amendment; that the liberty which is protected from infringement by the federal government or the states by the fifth and fourteenth amendments is not restricted only to those
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments.
66. [d.
67. If a concept of privacy is to be complete, it must embrace both momentous (Roe,
410 U.S. 113, (right to have an abortion); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.1976), (right
to choose between life and death) and every day ends of the spectrum (Kelly v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976) (county regulation limiting the length of county policemen's hair
does not violate the fourteenth amendment); for if it does not, it "leaves the state free to
interfere with those aspects of individual lives which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty." Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st
Cir. 1970) ("within the commodious concept of liberty embracing freedoms great and
small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes.").
68. See generally Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Singer) (discussion of the constitutional
aspects of the degradation process in prisons).
69. This concept is, however, working its way up the federal circuits. See infra notes
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There was a time when prisoners had no rights at all:
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of freemen and not of
convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men
have some rights it is true, such as the law in its
benignity accords to them, but not the rights of
freemen. They are slaves of the state . . . they
must be subject to the regulations of the institution ....70

Recently, however, the Supreme Court has established that
convicted prisoners "do not forfeit all constitutional protections
by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison."71 Constitutional guarantees which have been held to survive the
prison wall include: freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the fourth amendment,72 religious freedom under
the first and fourteenth amendments,78 protection against racial
discrimination under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,74 equal access to the courts,711 freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment,76
and due process of law. 77 Whether the right to privacy can be
extended to women prisoners as a basis for protection against
sexual harassment is the subject of the remainder of this
Comment.
93-105 and accompanying text.
70. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,796 (1871) (principles declared
in the bill of rights are not applicable to convicted felons).
71. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1978) (class action suit challenging the constitutionality of conditions in federal institution).
72. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
73. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (Texas violated the first and
fourteenth amendments by not allowing a Buddhist a reasonable opportunity to pursue
his faith).
74. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (Alabama statutes requiring segregation of the ra~es in prisons and jails violate the fourteenth amendment).
75. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 (1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom,
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (reasonable access to the courts is a constitutional imperative which prevails against a variety of state interests).
76. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (cruel and unusual punishment clause covers conditions of confinement which may make intolerable an otherwise
constitutional term of imprisonment).
77. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (per curiam) (since the court cannot
prove beyond a doubt that allegations of prisoner's pro se complaint cannot be supported. he is entitled to an opportunity to offer prooO.
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A. Bodily Integrity: Freedom from Unwanted Viewing by
Male Guards

In western culture certain values are second nature and
mandatory, such as clothing one's body or, more specifically,
one's genitals. Women and men appear to have an innate need
for privacy in certain areas of living as evidenced by the fact
that toilet facilities are enclosed in the home and segregated in
public. 78 The desire to protect one's nudity from unwanted exposure, particularly to members of the opposite sex, involves
both a physical instinct and an emotional and social craving for
privacy. In expanding the right to privacy to include the unwarranted observation of one's naked body, the Ninth Circuit
stated: "We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy
than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure
[sic] from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal
dignity. "79 This desire for dignity transcends the prison walls.
Indeed, state and federal courts have held that if guards are in a
position to watch inmates of the opposite sex who are engaged in
personal private activities, such as undressing, using toilet facilities, showering, or talking to medical personnel, the inmates'
constitutional rights of privacy have been violated. 80
Until now, however, female prisoners have instituted only
one suit81 challenging these prison practices. 8l1 In Forts v. Ward,
78. Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980) (administrative remedy granted to balance right of a female
prison inmate to privacy with the right of equal job opportunity regardle88 of sex).
79. York v. Storey, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Storey v. York,
376 U.S. 939 (1964).
80. See Gumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (1982) (male plaintiffs' statements
that they were subject to a "certain amount of viewing" by female guards does not necessarily fall short of a cognizable claim); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1316-17
(S.D. W. Va. 1981) (privacy of female prisoners severely infringed because male deputies
could peer into their cells); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (female guards viewing male inmates; inmate has a limited right to privacy which includes
the right to be free from unrestricted observation of their genitals by members of the
opposite sex); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980) (female guards
viewing male inmates; inmate has a limited right to privacy which includes the right to
be free from unrestricted observation of their genitals by members of the opposite sex);
Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210
(2d Cir. 1980).
81. Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 566 F.2d
849 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621
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the inmates charged that they were severely humiliated and deprived of their dignity because male guards were regularly permitted to view them naked. ss At the trial level, the court enjoined the assignment of male guards to night duty,S" from the
infirmary, and from making first rounds in the morning. The
court further ordered that the showers be modified so that
guards could not observe the women while showering. 811
It is neither penologically required nor permissible (1) that during the day an inmate be in a
situation where (a) she may be or must risk being
viewed completely or partly in the nude by a male
guard in the course of his duties or (b) she may be
observed while using the toilet; (2) that during
the night she be observed rising from sleep to use
the toilet, or suffer herself to be observed perhaps
numerous times during her sleep in whatever may
be her disarray of bed clothes or nightgown-or
no garments at all on a hot and airless night; (3)
that her head be directly observed by a male
guard while she is taking a shower; and (4) that a
male guard in the prison hospital be so stationed
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
82. The ruling in Dawson on behalf of the women prisoners was part of an opinion
which found that a county facility operated in violation of many rights of both female
and male prisoners. 527 F. Supp. at 1317.
83. In 1977, women inmates at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility sued for injunctive relief and damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), for redress of deprivation of
their right of privacy under the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments caused by the
posting of male guards in various places in the prison including the housing units. Forts,
434 F. Supp. 946. The complaint also alleged that the practices complained of constituted an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy and person of the plaintiffs under the
fourth amendment and that the mere placement of men in women's prisons is designed
to strip women prisoners of their dignity and moral integrity and was a violation of the
eighth amendment. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, at 9, cited in Forts v. Ward, 434
F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
The male corrections officers at Bedford Hills perform all duties previously performed by women corrections officers. The male officers were assigned to the housing and
hospital units in February, 1977, in response to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This complaint was filed two months later, in April 1977. 471 F. Supp. at 1097-98.
84. This ruling was modified in Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217, where the appellate court
vacated the order which prohibited the assignment of male guards to the nighttime
shifts. "We seriously doubt that the inmates' interests in style or even in avoiding the
occasional discomfort of warmth from a sleeping garment are of sufficient gravity to justify denial of equal employment opportunities [for the male guards)." ld. While such a
ruling at least provides a choice for the prisoner, the court makes it clear that the right
to dignity and autonomy for women is not as important as equal job opportunity for
men.
85. Forts, 471 F. Supp. at 1099-1101.
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as to permit him under normal circumstances to
view an inmate wholly or partially unclothed. 88

Crucial to its opinion was the court's conclusion that a woman's
right to bodily privacy is invaded if her head is obseryed when
she showers even though her entire body is not visible to the
male guard. Because the prisoner can see the guard and knows
she has no clothes on, her own sense of dignity and bodily integrity is invaded. 87 The court based its holding on the fact that
virtually all societies have rules for concealing female genitals,ss
and recognized a woman's particular need for bodily privacy.s9
Involuntary exposure takes on a greater significance for
women than for men in our society, where a woman's body is
viewed as a sexual object and commodity90 and where pornography and violence against women is acceptable. 91 For women, unwanted exposure is harassment in and of itself. Sometimes the
observation may be inadvertent, other times deliberate; but no
matter what the justification, the female will most always feel
embarrassment, humiliation, and shame. She will feel all that is
associated with the knowledge that her body is being viewed as a
sexual object. 92 Therefore, to subject a female prisoner to the
unwanted gaze of male guards while she is nude deprives her of
86. Id. at 1099-1100.

87. Id. at 1100, n.20.
88. Id. at 1098. "The fact that a need for privacy is the product of social condition-

ing makes it no less embarrassing or occasions no less feeling of shame when the privacy
is invaded." Id.

89.Id.
90. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 6-22
(1975) [hereinafter cited as BROWN MILLER] (study of women's status as chattel throughout history); MACKINNON, supra, note 3 at 174-75 (historically, women have been reQuired to exchange sexual services for material survival in one form or another); Note,
Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-A Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1211 (1980).
91. A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 3-7 (1974) (pervasiveness of violence
against women in this country); A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
101-28 (1981) (pornography and the objectification of women).
The gut distaste that a majority of women feel when we look
92.
at pornography ... comes, I think from the gut knowledge
that we and our bodies are being stripped, exposed and contorted for the purpose of ridicule to bolster that 'masculine
esteem' which gets its kick and sense of power from viewing
females as anonymous, panting playthings, adult toys, dehumanized objects to be used, abused, broken and discarded. . . . This, of course, is also the philosophy of rape.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 442.
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her integrity and is a violation of constitutionally guaranteed
privacy.
B.

The Physical Aspect: Freedom from Touching

Laws which prescribe punishment for rape, sexual abuse, assault, and battery provide the protections society has deemed
necessary in order to keep each individual free from unwanted
touching and violence. These protections extend to prisoners. 93
There are some situations however, where unwanted touching in
the form of searches is necessary to investigate crimes94 or to
keep prisons free of contraband.9~ The fourth amendment protects individuals from illegal invasions of their "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" by the government. 98 Courts have treated
body searches as serious intrusions, even those as slight as a
"frisk", because they inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment. 97
Courts have indicated that a body cavity or genital search
by a member of the opposite sex is a violation of the inmate's
right to privacy.98 A prison's interest in excluding all contraband
justifies its surveillance of the prisoners and their cells, and justifies body searches as well,99 But that security interest, as well
as the reasonableness of the search, is balanced against the inva93. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973). Prisoners have a constitutional right to be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence and sexual
assault. In a §1983 action, prisoners must demonstrate a "pervasive risk of harm to inmates from other prisoners" and that prison officials "failed to exercise reasonable care"
to prevent the unreasonable risk of harm or harm itself." [d.
94. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
95. Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872
(1973).
96. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 454 n.4 (1971) (warrantless search
and seizure of automobile unconstitutional under the fourth amendment).
97. 392 U.S. at 9.
98. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981). Pat searches excluding genital areas
by female guards upon male inmates did not violate their constitutional right to privacy.
The court stated, however, that a search of the genitals by a member of the opposite sex
was a needless indignity that is an imposition insofar as it goes beyond recognized necessity. [d. at 137. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982) (instructing female
guards to exclude the genital area on male inmates when conducting a frisk affords the
inmate the privacy he is entitled to in this context).
99. United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977) (lack of warrant requirement in prison rests upon lack of expectation of privacy and exigencies inherent in
prison atmosphere).
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sion of the prisoner's dignity.loo "To require one to not only submit to such a search, but to have it performed by a member of
the opposite sex could well, for many people, only add to the
feeling of degradation. "101
In a Fourth Circuit case, it was found to be an unreasonable
invasion of the female inmate's privacy to be stripped by a female guard in the presence of male guards. l02 The court reasoned that generally people have a special sense of privacy about
their genitals, and involuntary exposure to someone of the opposite sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating. lOS Certainly, if it is an unreasonable invasion of privacy to be stripped
and searched in the presence of male guards, it is unreasonable
to be searched by male guards. Indeed, that "special sense of
privacy" has been the basis for decisions which have dealt with
body searches by members of the opposite sex.104 In cases which
have involved female guards and male prisoners, courts have
held that pat searches were allowed so long as the genital areas
were excluded. loa A body search of a female prisoner by a male
guard which includes the genitals or breasts is a violation of the
fourth amendment because it unreasonably invades her expecta100. United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1978) (body cavity search
found unreasonable because the woman was not given notice that her voluntary absences
from prison could subject her to random searches). See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517
F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975) (court concluded that the right of privacy includes a
prohibition of humiliating and unnecessary searches, but allows a prison regulation authorizing random shakedowns). "We hold that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the
[f)ourth [almendment against unreasonable searches, at least to some minimal extent."
Id.
It is settled law that the determination of reasonableness in any fourth amendment
case depends on the particular facts of the case. To determine whether a particular
search or seizure was reasonable, the court must balance the public interest in conducting the search against the individual's fourth amendment interest. See United
States v. Martinez Fuerle, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (border patrol's permanent checkpoint station does not violate the fourth amendment). See also Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.
Supp. 896, 903 (D. N.J. 1976) (guards cannot conduct a visual and anal search of an inmate unless there is a reasonably clear indication that the inmate is concealing something in a body cavity); Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (D. N.J. 1976) (routine
rectal and testicle searches conducted in a debasing manner and not for any genuine
security purpose constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments).
101. United States ex reI. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
102. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 1119.
104. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122; Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 132 (Or. 1981).
105. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122; Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 132 (Or. 1981).
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tion of privacy.
This limited protection (i.e. excluding genitals and breasts),
however, is not enough. Because of the imbalance of power in
prison,106 the possibilities of rape and other forms of sexual
abuse dramatically increase if male guards are allowed to touch
the prisoners in any way.l07 Any touching, except that in a bona
fide emergency, 108 should therefore be viewed as a violation of
the fourth amendment and should not be permitted. 109

C. Freedom from Sexual Exploitation
The right to privacy, as set forth in Roe and its progeny,
encompasses the freedom to make certain important decisions. no Although the right to privacy has been narrowly interpreted, the Supreme Court has recognized at least the need for
autonomy in making decisions related to reproduction. l l l Since a
risk in any sexual relationship between a female inmate and a
male guard is the possibility of pregnancy, the choice of whether
or not to participate in that relationship should be protected by
Roe. Any choice involving autonomy and dignity in decision
making related to procreation must necessarily be recognized in
the fourteenth amendment notion of liberty.
Sexual relationships between inmates and guards are the
product of sexual exploitation and cannot be defined as voluntary.ll2 While most prisons have a policy that guards may not
"fraternize" with inmates,113 that policy does not afford the prisoner adequate protection. H • Often a prisoner will maintain a
106. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text. But cf. United States ex rei.
Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
108. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 1982) (only in a bona fide emergency
may the officer in charge depart from standards governing the use of force).
109. Violation of the fourth amendment in this sense is a violation of the compound
of privacy found within that amendment. See generally Singer, supra note 68, at 671-84.
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying
text.
111. [d.
112. Telephone interview with Dr. Jan Mickish, Professor of Criminology, Ball State
University (Sept. 16, 1982).
113. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
114. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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sexual relationship with a guard because she has been
threatened with some form of further punishment if she· does
not cooperateY& Generally, women prisoners do not voice complaints due to fear for their own safety and because they doubt
that any action will be taken to prevent the carrying out of the
threats or the sex abuse. lIB
The pattern of sexual exploitation which pervades prisons
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. ll7 If the patterns of exploitation
rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation, the prisoner's
right to be free from sexual exploitation has been violated. 118
This right may be included within the penumbra of the eighth
amendment and should therefore be included within the protected zone of privacy articulated in Griswold. 119 Thus, under
Roe and Griswold the prisoner would have a right to privacy
which includes freedom from forced sexual relationships.
Since the right to privacy is fundamental, it may be infringed upon only if the government shows a compelling state
interest.120 Because the power imbalance in the prisoner-guard
relationship is so great, government itself must eliminate sexual
harassment in prison or assume responsibility for prisoner ex115. Telephone interview with David Klein, Branch Chief of Northern Westchester
District Attorney's Office, New York (March 23, 1983). Recently two guards at Bedford
Hill's were charged with official misconduct and one with rape as a result of coercive
sexual encounters even though there was no physical force involved. Id.
116. [d.

117. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) For conduct to be characterized
as "cruel and unusual" under the eighth amendment, it must not be spontaneous, but
rather, due to conditions which make imprisonment intolerable. [d. at 1032.
118. The basic concept which underlies the eighth amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of men (women). Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). To prove that sexual exploitation rises to the level of an eighth amendment violation, there are three principal tests which must be applied:
1. The punishment in question must not shock the collective conscience of our
society;
2. The punishment must not be unnecessarily cruel; and
3. The punishment not go beyond the legitimate goals of the state.
Albert, supra note 14, at 40. The failure to provide an inmate with an environment that
does not impair his physical and mental health violates due process. Failure to provide
adequate living space and to provide security violates the eighth amendment. Adams v.
Matthias, 458 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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ploitation. The government's inaction in this case is as harmful
as pointedly condoning the activity.121 Therefore, the relevant
question is whether the government has a compelling interest
not to interfere in the sexual exploitation in prisons. Unless the
government has an interest in maintaining the power structure
and the sexual exploitation of female prisoners, a woman prisoner's right to be free from sexual harassment in prison, implicit
within the right of privacy, has been violated.
IV.

INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT UPON HUMAN

DIGNITY

The right to dignity and autonomy in prison has not yet
been recognized as fully as is necessary to protect women prisoners adequately.122 Generally, inmates retain rights that are not
inconsistent with prisoner status or with government interests in
rehabilitation and institutional security.123 Because women prisoners are generally less violent than male prisoners,124 institutional security, absent a bona /ide emergency,l2G should not be
the chief factor in establishing the parameters of female prisoners' rights. For security reasons it may be necessary to conduct
body searches to keep the prison free from contraband.126 However, even though the purpose of the search is legitimate, if it
"broadly stifle[s] fundamental personal liberties "l27 it may not
be pursued if the desired end can be reached by narrower
means. 128 Since a body search by a male is an invasion of the
woman's right to privacy, another less intrusive procedure must
be followed.
In United States v. Lilly129 the Fifth Circuit held that since
the prisoner did not have notice that there would be random
121. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
122. See infra notes 123·159.
123. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (correctional inmates
retain first amendment communicative rights which are not inconsistent with prisoner
status or with governmental interests in institutional security and rehabilitation). See
also supra notes 12·19 and accompanying text.
124. CHAPMAN, supra note 11, at 5.
125. 666 F.2d at 866.
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
128. [d.
129. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978).
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body searches, performing them was unreasonable and in contravention of her fourth amendment rights.130 Because notice is
required, there should never. be a situation in which a female
guard is not on duty to perform the necessary search. It is an
infringement of a woman's dignity and fundamental right to privacy to be searched by,131 or in the presence of,182 male guards,
when there is a narrower means to achieve the governmental objective. There is therefore no institutional security interest absent an extreme, bona fide emergency, strong enough to infringe
upon the prisoner's right to dignity. Thus, a male guard should
never have occasion to touch a female inmate.
Certainly, the government has no rehabilitation interest in
subjecting prisoners to unnecessary observation or touching by
guards of the opposite sex. 188 The government's reason for infringing upon the prisoner's right to privacy has been based on
the justification that guards must be offered equal job opportunity as mandated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 184
Ironically, inmate privacy rights have evolved from the same act
which protects job opportunities for opposite-sexed guards In
the prisons. 1811
In addition, the right to privacy for prisoners, upon which
the right to be free from sexual harassment is based, has evolved
as a defense against claims by female guards who seek equal access to employment in male institutions.188 Institutional secur130. Id. at 1246-47.
131. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
132. Id. See also Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981). One of the
defenses the prison can raise when charged with conducting a search in contravention of
the fourth amendment is that the prisoner gave consent to the search. At least one court
in dissent has recognized that consent cannot be the product of a threat that the search
will be done in the presence of males if a woman prisoner does not consent to the search.
Patently any consent under these circumstances is the product of coercion. Such a manipulation of a prisoner's right is not necessary for institutional security. United States
v. Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1248 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
133. 514 F. Supp. at 203-04.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) [ilt shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail to or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's ... sex .... "
135. See infra notes 136, 137, 141.
136. See, e.g., Meith v. Dothart, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ala. 1976), rev'd sub nom.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upheld an Alabama corrections regulation
which permitted the state personnel department to exclude women from working as
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ity 137 and privacy 138 have been used as a basis to limit female
guards equal job opportunities. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,139 the
Supreme Court denied a woman employment in an Alabama
maximum security institution for fear that she would be raped
by an inmate. Appellants' argument was based in part on the
inmates' right to privacy.uo
guards in male maximum security prisons on the basis of institutional security and privacy); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 781-82 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) (rejected the existence of privacy rights as a defense to Title VII charge);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 612
F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (administrative remedies
available to adjust any infringement on male inmate's privacy rights in order to allow
equal employment for female guards); Iowa Dept. of Soc. Servo V. Iowa Merit Emp.
Dept., 261 N.W. 2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1977) (placing female guard in a capacity where she
would conduct pat or strip searches on male inmates violated the inmates' constitutional
right to privacy); Long V. California State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 116
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1977) (because of adverse effects females may have on wards, being a
male is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for being a chaplain in the facility); Reynolds V. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. 1974) (selective work responsibilities
among correctional officers is reasonable to ensure privacy of inmates and does not discriminate against women).
137. Institutional security was the decisive factor in Dothard, 433 U.S. 321, 336. The
likelihood that incarcerated offenders would assault and rape women guards was seen as
a threat to prison security. Thus, being male was a BFOQ to be a prison guard as permitted by § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Under Title VII sex may be a
bona fide criterion but only in very limited circumstances. See Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer must prove that he had reasonable
cause to believe that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely
and efficiently the duties of the job in order for sex to qualify as a BFOQ). The ruling in
Dothard was the first enunciation by the court that each woman could not decide for
herself whether to risk the potential consequence of taking a contact position within a
prison. 433 U.S. at 336.
Institutional security and privacy rights were also major factors in Long v. California
State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974), where the court
looked at the consequences of no gender based discrimination in hiring a chaplain for a
boys' correctional facility. The court found that hiring a female chaplain would necessarily involve a loss of privacy rights for the boys since she would have a lot of contact with
them; therefore, they couldn't be informal in their living quarters. Since she could not
physically control them, she could be physically or sexually attacked by them. Therefore,
she could not take the position of chaplain. Because a woman's security is not a bona
fide rea~on for sex based discrimination, id. at 1013, the court looked to the interest of
the state and prison administration. They found that the state interest was rehabilitation, and if a boy/man raped a female chaplain, he was not being rehabilitated. The
court also did not view the duty of an employer to refrain from discrimination based
upon sex as requiring him to alter his facility or incur any costs just to suit the sex of the
person involved. Id. at 1015.
138. See Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (male inmate's
privacy rights violated by the assignment of female guards to posts where they could
view him entirely in the nude); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
139. 433 U.S. 321.
140. Id. at 346 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated:
It is strange indeed to hear state officials who for
years have been violating the most basic principles of human decency in the operation of their
prisons suddenly become concerned about inmate
privacy. It is stranger still that these same officials allow women guards in contact positions in a
number of non maximum security institutions,
but strive to protect inmates' privacy in the prisons where personal freedom is most severely restricted. I have no doubt on this record that appellants' professed concern is nothing more than
blatant discrimination. 1• 1

The absurdity of the argument that women would be raped
in men's prisons is apparent when "the proper response to inevitable attacks on both female and male guards is not to limit the
employment opportunities ... but to take swift and sure punitive action against the inmate offenders."142 Further, this desire
to protect women from rape does not extend to women's prisons,
where the chances of rape by male guards occurring within
prison walls are far greater. The greatest irony is that at no time
has a male guard brought a Title VII suit to assert his right to
work in a women's institution. It appears that any advances in
equal job opportunities for women guards or prisoners' rights in
general are merely the result of decisions ensuring males equal
job opportunities.
The right to privacy and dignity in prison has also evolved
from the assertion by both male Hs and female H4 prisoners that
they have a right to avoid unwanted intrusions by guards of the
opposite sex. When the prisoner asserts his or her right of privacy, the state then asserts the provisions of Title VII as a defense. In Forts v. Ward,HII the court granted initial injunction,
141. Id. See generally Comment, Sex Discrimination in Prison Employment: The
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and Prisoners' Privacy Rights, 65 IOWA L. REV.
428 (1980); Note, Balancing Inmates' Right to Privacy with Equal Employment for
Prison Guards, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 243 (Summer 1978).
142. 433 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982); Bowling v. Enomoto,
514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md.
1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
144. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
145. 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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reasoning that the strictures of Title VII do not mandate opportunities to "Peeping Toms". The court stated that since a prison
must have continual staff surveillance even the most considerate
male guard cannot avoid invading an inmate's privacy.146 The
initial injunction, which banned males from all areas of the
prison where the privacy of the women could be invaded, was
the broadest order in the entire Forts litigation. When the district court's decision was modified 147 and men were allowed to
guard the sleeping area at night, the appellate court gave greater
weight to the right to equal employment. The court held the inmate's privacy interest while sleeping was not sufficient to impair employment rights for male guards, provided the prisoners
were given suitable sleepware. 148 Therefore, on a hot, airless
night, an inmate must wear a heavy "Dr. Denton pajama"-or
other suitable sleepwear-if she does not want to be viewed in
the nude.149 The court made it clear that any interest in privacy
and dignity that the inmates have is carved out of the interest in
job opportunity.
The majority of cases, however, have balanced the individual's right to employment, without regard to his or her sex,
against the inmate's right to privacy and have created selective
work responsibilities among correctional officers.lllo In Forts, the
male guards were enjoined from the living and infirmary areas. 1II1 The court then articulated administrative steps,1II2 cre146. [d. at 949.

147. 621 F.2d at 1217.
148. [d.
149. [d. at n.ll.

150.
Harden,
151.
152.

See Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. at 1095; Gunther, 462 F. Supp. at 952, 957;
520 F. Supp. at 781.
471 F. Supp. at 1102.
[d. at 1097.
A directive was eventually promulgated entitled GUIDELINES FOR ASSIGNMENT OF MALE AND FEMALE
CORRECTION OFFICERS. The stated purpose of the directive was to:
1. Maximize full employment opportunities regardless of sex.
2. Minimize intrusion on individual privacy.
3. Establish guidelines to accomplish both of the above stated
goals.
The directive established various guidelines which reveal the
State's obvious awareness of the problems, and its concern for
the appropriate resolution:
1. Security staff members of the opposite sex to the inmate
population are not to be permanently assigned to shower areas
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ated by the prison, which would assure both the inmate's right
of privacy and the government's interest in security.
However, the balancing approach implemented at Bedford
Hills is proving to be inadequate;l!!S thus, other remedies for sexual harassment of women prisoners must be developed. The
right to bodily privacy and dignity of female prisoners must be
taken seriously.' "We must probe more deeply for the real
causes-otherwise we continue blindly and blandly to place
bandaids on cancerous sores. "1114

V.

CONCLUSION

Women incarcerated in American prisons face a punishment
beyond that imposed by the courts. They are systematically degraded by being forced to endure invasions of their personal dignity and autonomy. They are coerced into sexual relationships
with male guards, viewed in the nude, and sometimes raped and
sexually abused by them. Some facilities have set up guidelines
but those remedies do not effectively protect the prisoners;I!!!!
they merely cover-up a deeply rooted social problem. Removing
males from women's prisons is not "the" answer. Such action
where one has to work in open view of showering inmates.
2. Escort duty outside of a facility shall be performed only by
officers of the saine sex as the inmates to be escorted.
3. At least one officer of the same sex as the inmate population
at a facility must be assigned to each housing block.
4. No assignment is to be made requiring an officer to conduct
strip frisks of inmates of the opposite sex.

• * • • • • •

7. Unless emergency conditions dictate otherwise, correction
officers of the opposite sex shall announce their presence in
housing areas to avoid unnecessarily invading the privacy of
inmates of the opposite sex.
However, Guideline 7, for valid security reasons, is not always
honored.
Id. See also Dawson v. Kenrick, 527 F. Supp. at 1317 (after finding an invasion of female
inmate's privacy because male guards could peer into the women's cells at any time and
view the prisoners, the court ordered defendants to submit a plan (like the one in Forts)
to accommodate the prisoner's right to privacy).
153. One guard at Bedford Hills, the institution involved in Forts, was recently indicted for rape and official misconduct and another pled guilty to official misconduct.
Inmates at other institutions continue to complain of sexual abuse by male guards. See
supra notes 7, 11, and 116.
154. BURKHART, supra note 7, at 144.
155. See Appendix A infra, for state established guidelines regarding male guards in
women's prisons.
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will not eliminate the sexism and paternalism in women's prisons that is characteristic of American society in general, but the
analysis of the harassment in prisons due to their presence provides a theoretical base from which a remedy may spring. 1II6
There exists a right to bodily privacy. This right protects
women prisoners from sexual harassment. The right to privacy
lays the foundation for prisoners tq assert control over their sexual integrity and dignity in prison. There is no justification for
any diminution of that right. A prison may formulate rules and
regulations necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
prison, but those objectives should never outweigh a prisoner's
right to be free from sexual degradation.

Laurie A. Hanson*

156. Letter from Dr. Jan Mickish to Laurie Hanson (Sept. 17, 1982).
* Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. The author would
like to thank Alice Montgomery, San Francisco attorney for her help and
encouragement.
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APPENDIX A
CONTACT INC., WOMEN OFFENDER SURVEY

(1982) (unpublished

survey).
FEMALE CORRECTIONAL

TYPE O.

FACILITY/STATE

HOUSINO

Alaska: Ketchikan
Correctional Ctf.

PERCENTAOE
OF MALB

Women only
and Cooed

0%

ALASKA: Fairbanks

Women only

86%

ALASKA: Stata
Correctional Ctr.

Both sexes:
separate/not

SPECIAL TRAINING RESTRICTIONS

Co's

O. MALE CO's

Male officers may not be on duty without a
female oOicer present; males may not search
females.
None
Body searches done by female officers, if
done by male officer, female must be
present. Same sel: supervision.

co-correctional
ARIZONA: Center
for Women

Women only

70-72%

Men cannot do strip searches or obtain urine
specimen.

ARKANSAS:
Women's Unit

Women only

N/A

N/A

CALIFORNIA:
Correctional
Institution
(or Women

Women only

40%

Male C.O .• cannot conduct skin searches,
transporting, urinalysis, and showers.

COLORADO:

Women only

3%

Transporting and shaking down. Training for
all CO's i. cooed.

CONNECTICUT:
Correctional Institution

Women only

23%

Cannot transport offgrounds without female
staff; cannot pat/strip search; cannot staff'
full shift in living unit without female staff.

FLORIDA:
Correctional
Institution

Women only

20%

Male officers are not allowed in dorms or
other areas where female offenders live
without fomale CO's.

IDAHO: North Idaho
Correctional
Institution.

Female
compound
separate: school
is cooed.

50%

Very little contact inside female compound.

INDIANA: Women's

Women only

12.6%

Males are used for security in the yard and
for escort duty. Never alone in a housing
unit.

Women only

16%

There mu.t be one female CO on duty at
the same time 88 the male CO

Women's

Correctional Facility

Prison

IOWA: Women's
Reformatory

ILLINOIS: Dwight
Correctional Ctr.

Women only

KANSAS:
Correctional
Institution at Lansing

Co-correctional

42%

Orientation training; annual 2-week training
covers th is topic

KENTUCKY:
Correctional Institution for Women

Women only

20%

Males do not search or work in living areas.

LOUISIANA:
Correctional Institute
for women

Women only

7%

Male security officers are utilized at the
control centers, the outer perimeter and to
aid in disturbances.

MARYLAND: Correctional Institution
for Women

Women only

10%

A male officer cannot transport a female
(one on one), and male officers have limited
888ignmenta in living areas.

MAINE: Correctional
Center

Co-correctional

90%

No restrictions; a training program being
developed.

MASSACHUSETTS:
Correctional IH"~.

Women only

20%

Male. do not work without female on
housing unit.

Male officers may not shakedown inmates.
Also should not get self in "one on one"
situation.
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MICHIGAN: Huron
Valley
Women's Facility

Women only

MINNESOTA:

Women

9~c'

Have 1 male

Correct~

695

None

Proper ways of handling self with women,

and currently there is a policy to not have

tional Facility
MISSOURI:
Chillicothe

opposite sex in living units.

Co-correctional

20%

None

Women only

14%

Male officers are not assigned to work in the
living units and cannot perform any type of

Correctional Center

NEBRASKA: Center
for Women

searches on inmates or female visitors. There
are no restrictions 88 to males becoming
involved in physical restraint situations.

NEW MEXICO:
Radium Springs
Center for
Women

Women only

23%

Must do all jobs same as female COs except
for personal searches and long distance
transport.

NEW YORK: Albion
Correctional Facility

Women only &
co-correctional

73%

Males must announce their presence in
housing areas. Same sex officer must conduct
strip frisks and accompany on outside trips.

NEW YORK:
Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility

Women only

33%

NORTH CAROLINA:
Correctional Center

Women only

25%

Males are never alone with a resident, and
don't conduct searches or man 8 dorm.

NORTH DAKOTA:
Penitentiary

Segregated
Not cooed

None

N/A

OHIO: Reformatory
for Women

Women only

30%

Male CO's never permitted in sleeping areas
without an inmate-may assist as to
restraining.

OKLAHOMA: Mabel
Bassett Correctional
Center

Women only

30%

OREGON: Women's
Correctional Center

Women only

No body searches by males and no male.
alone in living areas.

Male CO's will announce themselves before
entering

8

dorm area.

No male CO's allowed. Male personnel must
announce presence in living units. Cannot
observe inmates in undressed state unless for

a bona fide emergency; male staff not
allowed to shake down females unless in
emergency.

PENNSYLVANIA:
State Correctional
Institution

Women only

SOUTH DAKOTA:

Women only

0

The Penitentiary has received an OK for a
bona fide occupational qualification for
femal .. only in the women's facility.

Women only

35%

Searching restrictions

Women only

29%

Primarily men work pickets and outside; no
men are allowed in sleeping quarters.

Women only

0

N/A

VERMONT:
Chittenden
Community Correctional Center

Co-correctional

90%

VIRGINIA:
Correctional
Center for Women

Women only

25%

and are not to place hands on inmates.

Women's Correctional

Facility
TENNESSEE: Prison

Males are not assigned to female housing
units, may not escort females by themselves,

for Women

TEXAS: Department
of Corrections

UTAH:
facility

~omen's

Must be accompanied by female officer at all
times in female areas.
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Women only

5O,}(,

Pat .earches conducted by female staff when
possible.

Women only

33%

Men are not permitted involvement in
routine personal searches, bathroom
8upervision, etc.

Women only

0

Provide special traDing for male officers in
areu or transport, floor responsibilities.

Women only

50%

Males receive training and attend seminars.

CALIFORNIA,
PLEASANTON Fel

66%

Have both male and female CO's; utilize
female officers (or strip searches of female
inmatea.

ILLINOIS,
CHICAGO Fel

...

For escorting officers, one male to 8 group of
women, never one to one. Strip searches by
women only,

66%

...

52%

Male CO'. are not routinely permitted to pet
or strip search female inmates.

Purdy Treatment
Center

WISCONSIN:
Taycheedah
Correctional Inst,

WYOMING:
Women'. Center

PUERTO RICO:
Industrial School
(or \Vomen

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

LEXINGTON,
KENTUCKY Fel

Co·correctional

WEST VIRGINIA,
ALDERSON Fel
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